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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-JOSEPH POKART
THE CODES UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT.-The formative period
of American industry under the National Recovery Act 1 is well
under way. The permanent features of the Act,2 and the presump-
tion that a liberal Supreme Court will uphold the constitutionality
thereof, find sufficient support in the evolution of American eco-
nomics.3 The realism of an emergency has swung the pendulum
from the hysterical anarchy of industrialism to a new laissez faire
in which the Executive adsorbs the powers of government and admin-
isters the economic affairs of the nation.4 There is nothing essen-
tially radical or de novo in this scheme of things; moreover, as an
industrial revolution devoid of terrorism and national calamity, it
would appear to be ultra-conservative. 5 The Act provides that the
Codes, voluntary or prescribed, have the effect of law when approved
by the President and apply to all members of the industry or indus-
tries affected. 6 The President stressed the co-operative and guild-
like nature of this rehabilitating program; 7 rather than compulsion,
one might say that exhortation to legislate under supervision was
invoked. In the presence of an emergency threatening survival of
the sovereign, there appears to be an inherent power of the federal
government to adopt reasonable and necessary measures to ensure
its preservation in perpetuo.s Modes of enforcing the promulgated
Codes are provided by the Recovery Act.9 The legal problems and
implications resident in the Codes and arising out of their enforce-
ment in the new era of commerce and industry necessitate concrete
148 Stat. -, approved June 16, 1933.
2 (1933) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 201.
'CHASE, PROSPERITY: FACT OR MYTH (1929); ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY(1931) ; LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933).
' The adverse arguments of improper delegation of powers and dictatorial
compulsion are fundamentally idle as shown by the efficient operation of
commissions and the fact that law and equity are in themselves no more than
ordained compulsion.
Limiting the present view to the implications of the Codes, the lawlessness
of industry which culminated in the financial debacle of 1929, supra note 3,
suggests that regulation of all industry is properly a sovereign right. It was
so at the early common law, infra note 125, and perhaps we have been in error
in presuming to guard jealously the absolute right to produce and dispose of
commodities essential to civilized life. The Codes, then, would have no funda-
mental quarrel with Constitutional provisions.
6 Supra note 1, tit. 1, §3 (b), (d).
'N. R. A. Bulletin No. 1 (June. 16, 1933).
8 Southport Petroleum Co. v. Ickes, Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia-United States News, August 12-19, 1933.
'Supra note 1, tit. 1, §3 (b), (c), (f) ; §4 (b).
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solutions which must come from the federal and state courts.10 It
is therefore of practical value to determine what the Codes contain.
Limitation of Production.
Recognition of the staggering economic waste in over-produc-
tion,'1 dissipation of natural resources and uncurbed conditional
selling' 2 justifies the appearance in the Codes of restrictions on
manufacture. The modus operandi of regulation has territorial and
personal phases. Zonal production limited to states or districts
within states is sometimes prescribed; 13 the allocation of production
has already occasioned jural notice. 14  The adjuvant to enforcing
regional production in the oil industry is found in the President's
power to prohibit transportation.15 Production of commodities is
regulated by various personal restrictions. Thus, the Codes for the
Lumber and Timber Products and the Petroleum Industries 16 seem
to exclude new enterprise from their ranks; registration of existing
10NIRA was to mother but one healthy offspring-American economic
stability; but the federal and state courts will be forced to take judicial notice
of the fact that NIRA has had a heterogeneous litter. They must, moreover,
close one or both eyes when considering the constitutional legitimacy of this
progeny. The New York State Recovery Act, Unconsolidated Laws 1933,
c. 781, renders the problem of local, intra-state enforcement less difficult in
New York. Something must then be done about the flotsam and jetsam left
by the tidal wave of the Recovery Act and its Codes. Employer and employee
will take legal inventory and the struggle between the two will proceed along
new and more vital channels. New causes of action, particularly in the prov-
inces of unfair competition, collective bargaining and sales, will modify and
enlarge the common law. See MODEL STATE RECOVERY ACT, Administrator's
Letter to Governors, February 12, 1934. See also Purvis v. Razemore, U. S.
Dist. Ct. for Southern Dist. of Florida, December 2, 1933. In the absence of
a state act, Congress may not interfere with purely local enterprise; proceed-
ings against a Code violator must be instituted by the U. S. District Attorney.
See also Opinion of the Attorney General, December 2, 1933. The Recovery
Act does not apply to the Philippine Islands. It is operative in Puerto Rico.
' Supra note 3.
'WHITNEY, LAW OF SALEs (2d ed. 1934) §§30, 55.
'CODE FOR THE LUMBER AND TIMBER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, art. 8; CODE
FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, art 3, §§3, 4, 5, 6. See also supra note 1, tit.
1, §9 (c) ; Regulations Prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, August 2,
1933; Order of the 'Secretary of the Interior Allocating Production, September
2, 1933. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, P. L. No. 10, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess., 1933, restricts production of cotton, wheat and hogs. Compare the
provisions of the Code for the Lumber Industry cited above with the holding
in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1921).
SInjunction restraining the Code Authority from enforcing allocation of
production denied. Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Watzek, U. S. Dist. Ct.,
Dist. of Oregon, January 4, 1934. Contra: Amazon Refining Co. v. Texas
Railroad Commission, U. S. Dist. Ct., Northern Dist. of Texas, February 12,
1934. Infra note 57 with reference to minimum wage zoning.
' Supra note 13.
'a Ibid
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mechanical devices and the prohibition of new installing and addi-
tional machinery, except for necessary replacements, is effected in
other industries. 17  Further, there are express stipulations concern-
ing production quota and withdrawal from storage; 18 likewise, maxi-
mum plant activity is controlled.' 9 And yet: "It is hereby declared
to be the policy of Congress * * * to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, [and] to
avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily
required)" 20 -which presents a patent ambiguity and paradox.
That conservation of natural resources and the cure of economic
waste is within the legislative scope of the sovereign power needs no
champion. Yet, every phase of the program and its application out-
lined above has previously been held to be in restraint of trade under
the Sherman Act.21 Criticism of these narrow holdings, the needs
of demoralized industry, and the obvious advantages of reasonably
controlled monopoly forced a relaxation of the strict rule where
industry, in the course of normal development, achieved incidental
monopoly in a particular field.2 2  The Constitution 23 would seem to
validate the Code restrictions on industrial production; the State
Recovery Act 24 extends the control to local, intrastate enterprise. 25
The Anti-Trust and Anti-Monopoly Laws are neither repealed nor
11 CODE FOR THE CoTToN TEXTILE INDUSTRY, art. 6 (3); CODE FOR THE
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, art. 5, §2; CODE FOR THE LACE MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY, art. 5, §3; CODE FOR THE TEXTILE BAG INDUSTRY, art. §6 (c).
. CODE FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, art. 3, §§1, 2, 3.
" CODE FOR THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY, art. 3; CODE FOR THE WOOL
TEXTILE INDUSTRY, art. 4.
2'Supra note 1, tit. 1, §1.
' U. S. ComP. STAT. §§8820-8823, 8827-8830; U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co., 125 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899); United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607 (1923).
" United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct.
293 (1920) ; see also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S.
32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (1918).
'CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Art. 1, §8, Clause 18. Under
this clause and with the precedents of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) ; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738,
6 L. ed. 204 (U. S. 1823); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S.
1823) and Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29
(1875), it would appear that Congress might, in the face of dire necessity,
incorporate national industries somewhat in the manner of public benefit
corporations. Surely the Codes, in comparison, achieve industrial regulation
with a modicum of governmental interference and minimize the omnipresent
danger of bureaucracy. See Theodore Roosevelt's speech of August, 1905,
concerning federal incorporation of corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce.
"Supra note 10.
' "The operation of the National Act is excluded, legally, from dealing
with industries purely intrastate (and in no way in or affecting interstate or
foreign) commerce, which refuse to sign the Codes. This refusal on the part
of such industries is rendered largely ineffectual, however, by the provision
of the New York State Recovery Act * * *" (1933) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
201, 202.
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suspended, but exemption thereunder is granted under approved
Codes while such affected industries avoid operating in restraint of
trade.26 The term "monopoly" has never received a lucid and precise
legal definition, and the difficulty seems to be that it has become more
aloof and paradoxical than heretofore. Moreover, while subject to
the control of past regulatory legislation, private enterprise no longer
has sole discretion over the extent of equipment and productivity of
manufacturing plants; nor over the number, age, labor hours, wages
and collective bargaining rights of employees.2 7 Despite these appar-
ently minute restrictive measures, there are certain glaring deficien-
cies in the Codes, outstanding among which may be cited the Code
for the Bituminous Coal Industry; in the latter there is a failure to
correct or even mention the notorious surplus capacity abuses.
Price Fixing.
In accord with the policy of regulating production, increasing
consumption, conserving natural resources and establishing a uniform
national economy,28 price fixing looms as a most important factor
in the Recovery Program. Direct and indirect methods are employed
to establish reasonable prices. The indirect means are largely con-
cerned with rectifying unfair trade practices.29  Direct price fixing
is achieved by express Code provisions to that effect; some are
explicit and definite; 30 others are ambiguous and flexible.3 ' The
adoption of a uniform plan of filing financial reports, based on stan-
dard methods of accounting and arbitral determination of "fair mar-
ket value" and "cost production," establishes the basis for price
regulation,3 2 which is binding upon all members of the industry
affected.3
3
'Statement of the Attorney General, July 6, 1933; Executive Order,
January 20, 1934; Statement of the General Counsel of the N. R. A., January
20, 1934.
'See under special topics, infra.
SSupra note 1, tit. 1, §1.
Infra, UNFAIR COPETITIOx, at p. 9.
o CODE FOR THE CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (i); CODE FOR
THE PETROLEUM INDUsTRY, Appendix A.
' CODE FOR THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY, art. 6; CODE FOR THE
ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 10; CODE FOR THE IRON AND
STEEL INDUSTRY, art. 7 and Schedule E.
" Code authorities are vested with the trust to prevent excessively high
prices or destructive price-cutting; the Administration and Consumers Advisory
Board act as a check upon the Code authorities to ensure this control. Ad-
ministrator's Summary and Preliminary Report. Release No. 2706, January
15, 1934. See also Recommendations of the National Association of Cost
Accountants, January 27, 1934.
-'CODE FOR THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 8; CODE FOR
THE LUMBER AND TIMBER PRODUCTs INDUSTRY, art. 9.
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The regulation of prices is at the very root of constructive as
opposed to destructive competition. There are Codes which provide
for the issuing of price schedules that shall be binding upon mem-
bers of the industry for definite periods of time.34 The courts will
probably reuse to enforce code provisions against violators where the
fixing of prices is ambiguous and indefinite. 35 But the United States
Supreme Court has sanctioned price fixing in the milk industry; 36
and an alleged violator has been held and successfully prosecuted
under the State Recovery Act.37 Enforced competition as a funda-
mental principle 38 of industrial economics has been abandoned under
the Codes. But similar price fixing has occurred during the New
York emergency housing situation.39 The criticism of price fixing
on the grounds of impairment of contract rights is impotent; 40 the
ineffectiveness of past attempts, and the claims that price fixing
results in preservation of inefficient producers and a prohibitive cost
of regulation to an inexperienced government resolve themselves, as
do most of the Code problems, into measures of satisfactory
enforcement. 4
1
' CODE FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, art. 5, rule 3; CODE FOR THE SALT-
PRODUCING INDUSTRY, art. 4.
'Injunction restraining under-charging denied, on the ground that the
Code for the Cleaning and Dyeing Industry fixes no minimum for the type of
service rendered by the defendant. Cleaners and Dyers Board of Trade v.
Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., Supreme Court-New York County, January
26, 1934, 91 N. L. Y. J. 441 (1934).
'Nebbia v. New York, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 531,
October Term, 1933; N. Y. Times, March 6, 1934, at 18; see also (1933) 8
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 82.
'The manager of Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., was held for trial before
the Court of Special Sessions for a violation of the State Recovery -Act in
cleaning a garment for a price less than the minimum established by the
Administrator under the Code for the Cleaning and Dyeing Industry. People
v. Denberg, Magistrate's Court, 7th Dist., New York City. Demurrer over-
ruled, defendant convicted and fined $500. People v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners
et al., Court of Special Sessions, N. Y. County, February 6, 1933.
2 Price fixing, binding a substantial part of an industry, is invalid regard-
less of the reasonableness of the price set. United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U. S. 332, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927). It is not within the legislative
power to fix prices or profits by any means. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle,
263 Fed. 134 (1920) ; Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup.
Ct. 338 (1919). An act punishing profiteering, where necessaries are sold at
exorbitant prices, is an abuse of the police power. United States v. Cohen
Grocery, 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1920). But see, for more elastic views,
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471
(1933); New York Clothing Manufacturers' Exchange, Inc. v. Textile Fin-
ishers' Association, Inc., 238 App. Div. 444, 265 N. Y. Supp. 105 (lst Dept.
1933).
'
2Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465
(1921).
1 In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., supra note 38, the Lever Act was
held invalid, not as interfering with contractual rights, but on the ground of
an arbitrary standard of guilt.
IThe problem of the Administration is not primarily to justify the
existence of the Codes under the Constitution, but, rather, enforcement. Regu-
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The enforcement of the Codes in effecting price fixing repre-
sents a plunge into the very centrum of social existence. An emer-
gency has catapulted economic theory into the legislature and market
place. The issue involves the equable distribution of the national
income, allocating a smaller share to profit-takers and distributing a
greater per capita wealth. The difficulties confronting this endeavor
are many and strike at deeply rooted traditions and prejudices.
Herein lies the character of the Codes as a peaceful and legal revolu-
tion. The difficulties 42 to be overcome are an attestation of the
inherent rapaciousness of the species in matters of trade and finance;
nor is the sovereign power to be excluded from this categorical
statement.43 The steel industry, in further illustration, has artfully
achieved sanction under its Code 44 for multiple basing points, which
establishes arbitrary price discrimination on a firmer basis than
obtained under the previously condemned "Pittsburgh Plus Plan." 45
lation of prices on a limited scale is doomed to failure, as past history reveals.
The Recovery Act and the Codes clearly represent a universal governmental
control of industrial prices. Whether this step presages an evolutionary
success or a catastrophic failure, the courts and lawyers will deal with the
ultimate results.
' Six types of complaint against the operation of Codes have been regis-
tered: (1) excessive price increases, (2) excessive surcharges, (3) local
profiteering, (4) limitations on discounts, (5) limitations on manufacture or
distribution, and (6) interpretations of cost as a level below which no sales
shall be made. Administrator's Release No. 3114, February 5, 1934.
'With reference to adjustment of contracts existing before the Codes
became effective, the President suggested the expedient of amicable revision of
such contracts. This proposition is expressly included in several Codes, i. e.,
Code for the Lace Manufacturing Industry, art. 6, Code for the Wool Textile
Industry, art. 7, Code for the Retail Trade Industry, art. 7, 2. "The United
States Government as a buyer of goods should be willing itself to take action
similar to that recommended to private buyers." Statement of President Roose-
velt, August 6, 1933. This is reminiscent of the holding in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440 (U. S. 1793). Compare, however: in the
matter of adjusting a government contract for processing duck manufactured
at the Atlanta Penitentiary, the Comptroller General wrote, concerning the
private contractor's rights, "You are advised there is no legal authority now
existing to use appropriated public money to pay another price than the price
fixed by the contract of January 20, 1933." N. Y. Times, August 17, 1933
But prison products are to be sold not lower than at the current price prevailing.
Executive Urder Approving Code for the'Cotton Garment Industry, November
17, 1933. To the same effect: "Therefore, under the well established rule that
general words in a statute do not'include the government, the marketing rules,
Article IV-B of the code for the motor vehicle retailing trade, would appear
to have no application to sales to the Federal government." Ruling of the
Comptroller General, November 11, 1933. It is altogether strange and
depressing that, whereas the federal government has urged or compelled private
industry to increase wages and decrease hours of labor, the federal, state and
municipal governments have adopted an extensive program of salary-cutting
and payless furloughs which are productive of widespread hardship. ' Ferdinand
Douglas, Radio Address, March 11, 1934.
" CODE FOR THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, Schedule F.
'This renders the addition of fictitious freight rates difficult of detection
or control. See FETTERER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
There is no express provision in the Code for the Bituminous Coal
Industry 46 against selling below cost. This is particularly significant
in view of the enormous surplus capacity production in that industry
and its intimate correlation with waste of natural resources, minimum
wages and the economic status of miners. The relationship between
employer and employee in the coal industry has long been a notorious,
latent industrial war with intervals of patent blood-letting and repres-
sion. There would, however, appear to be no clear distinction
between the immunity to price fixing achieved by the federal govern-
ment and the powerful industries. In the process of levelling indus-
trial prices and effecting recovery, these arbitrary exemptions may
prove to be the hurdles which will nullify the entire, beneficent,
paternal scheme. President Roosevelt has said: "All employers in
each trade now band themselves faithfully in these modern guilds." 47
It will be interesting and instructive to note the construction which
the courts will put (or be forced to put) on the words "all" and
"faithfully" when applying them to powerful industrial units.
Minimum Wage Regulation.
Before the present crisis, attempts to fix minimum wages for
labor have generally been held to be violative of the due process
clause.4 8 Exception has been noted when the Adamson Act, fixing
the wages of employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce,
was upheld as a valid emergency measure.4 9 The Industrial Court
Act was held violative of the due process clause in fixing wages, but
solely because the packing industry was not affected with a public
interest as regards the wages of its employees.5 0 In this day and
age, when emergency has affected all industry with a public interest,
the fixing of minimum wages by the Codes may be amply justified.
It will be interesting and significant in its influence on the law to
note whether a national recovery and return to robust economic
health will leave all industry affected with a public interest.51
The Codes generally contain specific minimum wage require-
ments.52  Examples of ambiguity and flexibility are encountered.
53
Classification of employees may defeat the purpose of the Recovery
"Supra note 31.
1 N. R. A. Bulletin No. 1.
' Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
" Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
" The distinction drawn by the Court between industry affected with and
not affected with a public interest, is theoretically lucid but practically nebulous.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923).
' Infra notes 125 and 126.
a' CODE F01rXHE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 2; CODE FOR
THE LUMBER AND TIMBER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, art. 7; CODE FOR THE WOOL
TEXTILE INDUSTRY, art. 2.
"CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 6.
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Act, and there are Codes which expressly frown upon such classifi-
cationY4 The paper and pulp industry pays higher wages to men
than to women in the Northern and Central Zone; 55 identical wages
are allowed by some Codes where women are performing the same
work and duties as men.5 6
The United States District Court has granted a temporary
injunction restraining the N. R. A. Administration from enforcing a
minimum wage scale in a certain locality on the ground that division
of the country into minimum wage zones is arbitrary. 57 Elsewhere, a
justice court has held 58 that an employee may have judgment for
the difference between the minimum wage authorized by a Re-
employment Agreement and the wage actually paid on the theory
that the employee is the beneficiary of a contract between the Presi-
dent and the employer.5 9 The courts will, unquestionably, be forced to
deal with a wide variety of causes arising under the regulation of
minimum wages.
Hours of Labor.
A majority of the Codes prescribe maximum hours of labor for
employees engaged in the particular industries.60 Evasion of this
program is prevented in some instances by prohibiting an employee
from working for more than one employer beyond the maximum
number of hours prescribed in the aggregate.6 ' The purpose of
such regulation is to establish recognized standards, limit production,
increase employment and ensure fair employment contracts. The
element of regulating hours of labor as a health measure is certainly
not significant in this program.
Limitation of hours of labor has been previously sustained on
the grounds of public welfare, public interest, public health and
emergency. 62  Moreover, the hours of labor of employees of the
CODE FOR THE COTTON GARMENT INDUSTRY, art. 6 (F); CODE FOR THE:
DRESS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 5, §6; CODE FOR THE PAPER AND PULP
INDUSTRY, art. 6, §4.
' CODE FOR THE PAPER AND PULP INDUSTRY, art. 5, §1.
'2 CODE FOR THE ADVERTISING SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art.
4; CODE FOR THE FARM EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY, art. 5, §3 (b).
'Scapellati v. N. R. A. Administration, United States Dist. Court. for
COnnecticut (Equity No. 2328), January 2, 1934.
'Official Release No. 2607, January 8, 1934, citing - v. Sam Taylor,
Justice Court, Kansas City, Mo.
' Infra under PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, at 414.
' CODE FOR THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 3; CODE
FOR THE COAT AND SUIT INDUSTRY, art. 3.
' CODE FOR THE CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 4 (d).
'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S.
426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917) ; Wilson v. New, supra note 49.
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federal, state and municipal governments may be validly regulated.6
But hitherto the doctrine prevailed that where no injury to the
general public resulted, an adult man could not lawfully be prevented
from working a given number of hours per day in an industry not
harmful to health and longevity per se.64 There is no doubt but
that the Thirty-Hour Work Week Bill 65 had its origin as an emer-
gency employment measure and presaged the Code provisions.
Whereas emergency stimulated this program, it will be important to
note what permanent effect this will have on governmental regulation
of the right to contract for labor and services.66 Certainly, the hit-
or-miss practice of capital and labor, punctuated by strikes, in arriv-
ing at schedules of working hours should be corrected and reasonably
controlled by governmental supervision. The broader horizon of a
national point of view in this matter will make for superior legis-
lative and judicial remedies and submerge narrow community and
factional aspects in the general public welfare.
Child Labor.
The principle that child labor is undesirable is self-evident. 67
Where the abolition of child labor as a health measure may have
failed to appeal, economic stress and unemployment of adults has
revived the problem. The Codes are, with some exceptions, fairly
uniform in abolishing labor by those under sixteen years of age. 68
The industries in which children of fourteen or fifteen years are
permitted to work provide in their Codes 69 that (1) such labor is
not to exceed three hours per day, six days a week, or, (2) one day
per week, not to exceed eight hours. The minimum working age
'United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400 (1876) ; see also People v. Metz,
193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070 (1908).
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
S. 158, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (The United States Daily, April 1-8,
1933 at 8.)
It would seem from a logical analysis of the Code principles that, not
only in time of war or economic emergency, but also in normal periods, the
right to barter labor and services is affected with a public interest and should
be merged in thq public welfare to ensure the avoidance of economic and
sociologic imbalance.
"The end, to remove conditions leading to ill health, immorality and the
deterioration of the race, no one would deny to be within the scope of consti-
tutional legislation." Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, supra note 48. See also Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60 (1913) ; People v. Ewer, 141 N. Y.
129, 36 N. E. 4 (1894).
' CODE FOR THE COTTON GARMENT INDUSTRY, art. 6 (A); CODE FOR THE
DRESS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 5, 1; CODE FOR THE STOCK EXCHANGE
FIRMS, art. 2, §2.
" CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 4, §2; CODE FOR THE RETAIL
JEWELRY TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 3, §2.
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is sixteen years in the motion picture industry,70 except where child
actors are required and local laws are observed. Concessions are
made to tender years in some Codes 71 where industry or phases of
industry involve special hazards or danger to health. The minimum
age for such occupations is usually eighteen years, although seventeen-
year-old coal miners are sanctioned. 72
Collective Bargaining.
An important feature of the Recovery Act is the mandatory 73
inclusion of the substance of §7 (a) in all Codes.74 Employees are
granted the right to collective bargaining; compulsion to join or
refrain from joining a union is prohibited; and the employer is
required to comply with Code hours, minimum-wage and other
provisions. The evolution of precise means, through the Codes, of
adjusting disputes between capital and labor will go far toward favor-
ing industrial tranquility. The prohibition of "yellow dog" con-
tracts 75 is a direct grant of power to labor, the indirect results of
which may be useful in constituting an additional force to coerce
recalcitrant industrialism.
The majority of industries adopted §7 (a) in their Codes un-
qualifiedly. Some, however, attempted to restrict the effect of the
Act by reserving the right to interpret the section. 76 Others have
extended the meaning of the section. 77 The Administration has
7 0 CODE FOR THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY, art. 4.
" CODE FOR THE NEWSPRINT INDUSTRY, art. 5, §1; CODE FOR THE SOUTHERN
RICE MILLING INDUSTRY, art. 5, §1; CODE FOR THE PAPER AND PULP INDUSTRY,
art. 6; CODE FOR THE PYROTECHNIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 5, §1.
' CODE FOR THE BrruTUiNOus COAL INDUSTRY, art. 5 (G).
" Supra note 1, tit. 1, §7 (a), "Every code of fair competition, agreement,
and license approved, prescribed or issued under this title shall contain the
following conditions: (1) that employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain, collectively * * * ; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employ-
ment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization
of his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall comply with the maximum
hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment,
approved or prescribed by the President"
, See N. R. A. Official Release No. 93, July 26, 1933.
Compare: Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908),
which held that laws making it unlawful or a misdemeanor for an employer
to discharge an employee because of the latter's membership in a labor union,
or, to force an employee to enter into a "yellow dog" contract, are invalid.
"' Art. 5 (B) of the Code for the Bituminous Coal Industry, and art. 4
of the Code for the Boot and Shoe Industry were not approved by the Presi-
dent and deleted from the said Codes.
' CODE FOR THE BITUmINOUS COAL INDUSTRY, art. 5 (E), (F) : Employees
are not compelled to live in houses rented from the employer, nor required to
trade at a company store.
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denied the right to employers to interpret the section. 78 The auton-
omy of labor is essential to arrive at industrial stability in a sociologic
sense, and uniformity in the adoption of the guarantees of §7 (a) in
the Codes will provide the first concrete basis for judicial solutions of
disputes between capital and labor. A particularly favorable influ-
ence will obtain with reference to strikes. Whereas the Clayton
Act 79 recognized the rights of organized labor, the Codes enlarge
and fortify such rights.80 There need be no undue fear of abuse of
such vested power 81 as a group of recent decisions indicate.8 2 The
remedies made available on sound statutory authority will establish
an equitable solution to disputes between employers and employees
whether, in a given community, one or the other is more powerful.
" "The plain meaning of Section 7 (A) cannot be changed by any
interpretation by any one * * *. The words 'open shop' and 'closed shop' are
not used in the law and cannot be written into the law. These words have no
agreed meaning and will be erased from the dictionary of the N. R. A."
Joint statement of Administrator and Chief of the Legal Division, August 24,
1933. See also Decision of National Labor Board, Release No. 739; and
Letter of the President to the Administrator, October 19, 1933: "While there
is nothing in the provisions of Section 7 (a) to interfere with the bona fide
exercise of the right of an employer to select, retain or advance employees on
the basis of individual merit, Section 7 (a) does clearly prohibit the pretended
exercise of this right by an employer simply as a device for compelling
employes to refrain from exercising the rights of self-organization, designation
of representatives and collective bargaining, which are guaranteed to all
employes in Section 7 (a)."
11 38 Stat. 738: Strikes by trade unions are legalized, and agreements to
bring about strikes for bona fide purposes are not within the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law; however, malicious strikes and those attended by violence and
intimidation are not within the letter of the Clayton Act.
'Temporary injunction denied, on the ground that the Recovery Act
fortifies employees' rights to unionize and picket the places of business of
recalcitrant employers. Kings County Haberdashers Association v. Retail Hat
& Furnishing Salesmen's Union, Supreme Court, Kings County, January 11,
1934, 91 N. Y. L. J. 175. Injunction pendente lite granted, restraining employ-
ers operating under a Code from violating the provisions of §7 (a) incor-
porated in said Code. Sherman v. Abeles, Supreme Court, New York County,
January 2, 1934, 91 N. Y. L. J. 21. Injunction granted, restraining defendant-
employer from imposing upon striking employees the condition of joining a
particular union designated by the defendant before reinstatement. Floramon
Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462 (1933).
The right to cease work is not absolute; a conspiracy to obstruct inter-
state commerce may be enjoined. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 2 F. (2d) 993 (1924).
' A labor union is enjoined from exhibiting signs (during a strike against
the plaintiff-employer, member of an industry operating under an approved
Code) charging non-compliance with the N. R. A., as improper before deter-
mination of such alleged non-compliance by a proper tribunal. Rosenthal-
Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, Supreme Court, Dutchess County, October 12,
1933. Alleged violations by the employer of a Code labor provision is no
defense to an action by the employer to enjoin the defendant labor union from
prosecuting an irregular and malicious strike. The federal government is the
party to whom a cause of action accrues for such violations. J. & T. Cousins
Co. v. Shoe & Leather Workers Industrial Union, Supreme Court, Kings
County, November 18, 1933.
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The National Labor Board has been constituted 8 3 to adjust
industrial disputes arising out of the interpretation and operation of
the Codes in matters of employment. It has the distinct powers (1)
to settle differences between employers and employees by mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, (2) to authorize local or regional Boards,
(3) to review the findings of local or regional Boards, and (4) to
promulgate rules and regulations governing its procedure. It is not
inconceivable that such a body may, as in the instance of Chancery,
evolve into a special system of industrial courts.
Unfair Competition.
One of the purposes of Congress in passing the Recovery Act
was to eliminate unfair competitive practices in the industries.8 4
"Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code
or codes of fair competition * * *." 85 The response of industry
with a recital of unfair competitive practices has probably surpassed
the fondest hopes of Congress; their number and variety is legion.
Whereas it may be true that many phases of the Recovery Act and
the Codes thereunder will never receive judicial notice, there is a
certainty that members of industry, having learned to point the
finger, will be loath to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs when
economic conditions are restabilized. The legislative view of unfair
competition 86 and the jural requirement of the concurring elements
of (1) harm to the public, and (2) harm to competitors, necessary
to constitute the wrong of unfair competition, are shown to limit the
concept too strictly, unless a harm to competitors is per se a harm to
the public at all times. A host of civil actions will be engendered, if
nothing more, by the expansive view of unfair competition as mir-
rored in the Codes; this reaction will begin when individual indus-
tries or members thereof find that the Administration means to
enforce the Codes. The multitude of unfair practices listed renders
it impossible to be exhaustive, but a comprehensive survey is essen-
tial to grasp the nature of conditions for which industry seeks relief.
Primarily, the importance of unfair competition to government
and industry attaches to the fixing and maintenance of prices and
profits. In this connection, the obvious and direct question of under-
selling has been dealt with in many Codes by express prohibition.8 7
I Executive Order, December 19, 1933. (Originally created August 5,
1933.)t
'Supra note 1, tit. 1, §1.
I d. tit. 1, §3 (a).
'FEDERAL TRADE ComIssioN ACT, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A.
41, 45, 46 (1928).
8 CODE FOR THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, arts. 9 and 10;
CODE FOR THE LEGITIMATE THEATRE INDUsTRY, art. 16, §5; CODE FOR THE
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The indirect, but nevertheless significant, influence of a multitude of
trade practices on prices and profits, raises the issue of what con-
stitutes unfair competition.8 8 An examination of the Codes is neces-
sary to learn what industry conceives unfair competition to be.
Price-cutting by subterfuge is considered unfair competition by
many industries. Thus, the giving of refunds and rebates,8 9 arbi-
trary trade-in allowances,9 ° and the use of cut-rate scrip and coupon
books 91 are banned.9 2  More subtle are the injunctions against pro-
longed servicing, 93 selling at prices reduced from fictitious prices, 94
commercial bribery, 95 substitution of superior materials for those
ordered,96 excessive commissions, 97 maximum credit and discount
terms,98 acceptance by retailers of non-negotiable or company scrip, 99
and exclusive outlets.'00 The interdicted practices listed by the Codes
are sometimes reiterations of accepted concepts, but there are also
novel views hitherto untested in the courts. Thus, the restraint on
rebates to employees or agents of a purchaser is not unknown to the
law; 101 nor the registration of union labels and the ban on counter-
feiting the same; 102 nor the express provisions against monopoly,
discrimination and oppression of small enterprise. 03  But unfair
RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 8, §1; CODE FOR THE SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP-
REPAIRING INDUSTRY, art. 7 (a).
'The gist of the matter would seem to be that unfair competition is a
mixed question of law and fact rather than a question of law only. Compare:
CODE FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, art. 5, rule 7, and the holding in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 276 F. (1st) 686 (C. C. A. 7th,
1921).
' CODE FOR THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY, art. 6, §§7, 17, 18.
' CODE FOR THE GASOLINE PUMP INDUSTRY, art. 7 (g); CODE FOR THE
MOTOR VEHICLE RETAILING TRADE, art. 4 (A), (B).
" CODE FOR THE RETAIL FOOD AND GROCERY TRADE, art. 9, §3 (a); CODE
FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, art. 5, rule 3.
The Recovery Act will not be construed to prohibit payment of patron-
age dividends to any member of a bona fide co-operative organization. Execu-
tive Order, October 23, 1933.
' CODE FOR THE OIL BURNER INDUSTRY, art. 6.
' CODE FOR THE MARKING DEvIcES INDUSTRY, art. 8.
' CODE FOR THE CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (c), (3) ; CODE
FOR THE ICE INDUSTRY, art. 9; Commercial Bribery Interpreted, Executive
Order, November 27, 1933. But compare: Kinney-Rome Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 275 F. (lst) 665 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
" CODE FOR THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, sched. H, (D).
' CODE FOR THE LUMBER AND TIMBER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, sched. B,
§4 (b).
9s CODE FOR THE CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (f).
CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 9, §4.
'9 CODE FOR THE BREWING INDUSTRY, art. 4.
'9' CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (d) ; to the same effect,
Donemar v. Molloy, 252 N. Y. 360, 169 N. E. 610 (1930); see also NEW YORK
STATE PENAL LAW §439, making it a misdemeanor to give or receive money
for the corrupt influencing of agents, employees or servants.
"9 CODE FOR THE COAT AND SUIT INDUSTRY, art. 7. To the same effect:
Perkins v. Heert, 158 N. Y. 306, 53 N. E. 18 (1899).
'03 CODE FOR THE COTTON GARMENT INDUSTRY, art. 14; CODE FOR THE DRESS
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 10; CODE FOR THE HOSIERY INDUSTRY, art. 12;
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practices either new to the law or in conflict with existing holdings
are to be noted. These include the condemnation of harassing com-
petitors with threats of litigation, 04 enticing away employees, 10 5 mis-
branding merchandise, 10 6 espionage and defamation, 0 7 hotels solicit-
ing business through taxi-drivers' 0 s and the elimination of work
done in homes, tenement houses and sweat-shops; 109 further, pay-
ment of unreasonably high salaries is interdicted.1 0 "It is a funda-
mental principle * * * that trust institutions should not engage in the
practice of law."111 Merchandise sold at a discount must be so
stamped," 2 as must also "irregulars," "seconds" and "thirds." 13
False advertising is vigorously denounced; " 4 and likewise design-
piracy." 5 The dating of seasonal sales in clothing has been pre-
scribed." 6 Affecting the law of sales is the inclusion in a number
of Codes of an absolute prohibition against selling on consignment."
7
It will be apparent from this brief r6sum6 that the existing
precedents of unfair competition are inadequate to deal with the
problems presented by distressed private enterprise unless all indus-
try is conceived to be affected with a public interest. The approval
or disapproval of trade practices is not new," 8 but if the criteria of
unfair competition as set up in the Codes are to be sustained as a
question of law," 9 the courts must be ready to find the same elas-
CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 11, §3. To the same effect: FED-
ERAL AND STATE ANTI-MONOPOLY and ANTI-TRUST LAWS.
" CODE FOR THE SCIENTIFIC APPARATUS INDUSTRY, art. 7.
't CODE FOR THE ICE INDUSTRY, art. 9. But see Clark Paper & Manufac-
turing Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708 (1923).
"03 CODE FOR THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY, art. 8, §1 (a).
17 CODE FOR THE OIL BURNER INDUSTRY, art. 6.
20 CODE FOR THE HOTEL INDUSTRY, art. 8.
"e' CODE FOR THE COTTON GARMENT INDUSTRY, art. 7; CODE FOR THE DRESS
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, art. 5, §8; CODE FOR THE LUGGAGE AND FANCY
LEATHER GOODS INDUSTRY, art. 5; CODE FOR THE UNDERWEAR AND ALLIED
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, pt. 2, §2.
no CODE FOR THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY, art 5.
'u CODE FOR BANKS, sched. A, art. 7, §2.
' CODE FOR THE HOSIERY INDUSTRY, art. 8, §4 (c).
13 CODE FOR THE HOSIERY INDUSTRY, art. 8, §8; CODE FOR THE UNDERWEAR
AND ALLIED PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, pt. 6.
2" CODE FOR THE BEAUTY AND BARBER SUPPLY INDUSTRY, art. 9 (I); CODE
FOR THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY, art. 8, §1 (b); CODE FOR THE LEGITIMATE
THEATRE INDUSTRY, art. 17; CODE FOR THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY, art. 9,
§1 (a), (b), (c); see also KALLETT AND SCHLINIC, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS
(1933). But compare: Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam CO., 283 U. S.
643, 51 Sup. Ct. 587 (1931).
116 CODE FOR THE CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (k); CODE FOR
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, sched. H (c). But compare: Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
"0 CODE FOR THE MEN'S CLOTHING INDUSTRY, art. 10.
T CODE FOR THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY, art. 6, §6; CODE FOR THE
CORSET AND BRASSIERE INDUSTRY, art. 9 (g); CODE FOR THE HOSIERY INDUS-
TRY, art. 8, §5; CODE FOR THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, sched. E, §8; CODE
FOR THE MENS CLOTHING INDUSTRY, art. 12.
"'SHIPPING ACT, 39 Stat. 733 (1916) ; and supra note 86.
2" Supra note 88.
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ticity and tensile strength in the words "unfair competition" as they
have been able to do with regard to "due process."
Private Enterprise.
The Codes profess to be a covenant or partnership between
industry and government. 1 20  These designations, however, are appli-
cable only if loosely employed. Important elements of the contrac-
tual status are clearly lacking, and it would be a strange partnership
indeed in which one member promulgated and prescribed modes of
conduct and enforced penalties against the other. The creation of
Codes,x2 ' Agreements and licenses 122 represents, in reality, govern-
mental control of private enterprise.
The Codes are incomprehensible without recourse to the history
of industrial regulation and economics. 1 23  In this sense, the Recov-
ery Act and the Codes are the natural products or vintage of socio-
logical, legislative and judicial evolution. The express provisions of
the Act, that monopolies are not to be fostered and small enterprise
is not to be oppressed,'1 24 pay tribute to the concepts of free compe-
tition and the natural right to engage in lawful private business.
Successive and dismal failures characterize previous attempts to
regulate industry in the best interests of the public welfare. This is
explicable on the paradoxical ground that the courts enforced com-
petition and nevertheless sought to restrain unfair and unsafe prac-
tices. There is irreconcilable conflict between industrial circumstan-
tial automatism and intelligent governmental control. Factually, the
Codes attempt regulation of private enterprise on an experimental
basis over a period of two years. The theory under which they
operate is neither novel 125 nor inconsistent with the privileges
granted to persons by the Constitution. 1 26 The novelty of the Codes,
President's Address, May 7, 1933; New York Times, May 8, 1933, at 1.
'
2 Supra note 1, tit. 1, §3 (a), (d).2 Id. tit. 1, §4 (a), (b).
Supra notes 3, 5 and 10; also infra note 125.
24 Supra note 1, tit. 1, §3 (a), (2).
" The terms free trade and free competition in their earliest connotation
had a significance identical with free town, in so far as the use of the wordfree is concerned. Under early common law, governmental control of com-
merce and commodities was absolute and paramount; but free competition was
fostered only in regard to articles dealt in at markets and fairs. Similarly,
the continental fairs had their royal commissioners, tribunal of fairs, and
Chamber of Accounts appeals. DARESTE DE LA CHAVANNE, 2 HISTORIANS'
HISTORY OF THE WORLD 96 (1926). The successive Anti-Trust Laws are
modern efforts to control huge market activities. The Federal Trade Com-
mission is another phase of this regulatory mechanism. The Shipping Act of
1916 enunciates methods of approving standards of fair competition.
""Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably
curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business * * * cannot
be upheld," says Mr. Justice Sutherland in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U. S. 262, at 308, 53 Sup. Ct. 371, at 385 (1932). But economic emer-
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as compared with previous legislation, will become apparent only by
dint of successful enforcement. 127
Monopoly is not inherently harmful, unlawful nor unconstitu-
tional. 128  Governmental control of successful and efficient monopoly
in industry has, by a process of exclusion, come to be the recognized
salvation of national commercial integrity as expressed in the Codes.
The independence of small enterprise is incompatible with the ulti-
mate goal of industrial regulation. 129  The curtailment of over-
production, economic waste, depletion of natural resources, unfair
competition, unconscionable profits, unbalanced sociological condi-
tions, and piratical commercial ventures which undermine govern-
ment-the problem undertaken by the Codes under the Recovery
Act-has far-reaching beneficial implications with reference to na-
tional and international finance, stability and peace. To hazard
predictions as to the permanence of the present Codes, in form or
in substance, would be futile and frivolous.
The importance of the Recovery Act and its Codes assumes a
special significance if we realize that the present depression is entirely
different in character from any we have had before in the United
States. Previous depressions have been relieved by the migration
of the financially insolvent to spreading frontiers, or the stimulus
of war on trade has been the saving grace. There are no longer
spreading American frontiers; the barbaric interpolation of war as
a remedy for industrial conditions is to be deprecated. The United
States Supreme Court is faced with issues vaster and more significant
than those presented by the negro slavery problem. Then, as now,
gency has been held to affect industry with a public interest. Wilson v. New,
supra note 49. There is grave doubt whether the right to engage in industrial
enterprise (in such a manner as to threaten the survival of the sovereign and
industry) is to be sustained, historically and legally, as a natural right. Divested
of forms and flummery, the substance of the Recovery Act and the Codes
indicates that all industry is affected with a public interest. The right to
produce and dispose of commodities may be compared with the right to dispose
of property at death; the N. R. A. and its Codes are therefore analogous to
the Statute of Wills and the Decedent Estate Law. The successful regulation
of industry must rest on something more than a flimsy rule of emergency;
continuous rather than intermittent, flexible and ineffective control of industrial
enterprise for the public weal and as a prophylactic against economic calamities
depends upon a clear recognition of the statutory nature of industrial prop-
erty rights.
L-7 Supra notes 41, 43, 44, 45.
" Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, supra note 126. Furthermore, government per se is a monopoly; its
departments function as monopolies within a monopoly. The term monopoly
does not connote a necessarily evil or undesirable intent or effect.
- Independent small enterprise is wasteful, unorganized, inefficient and
chaotic, costly to the consumer of commodities and extremely difficult to
control. See N. R. A. Release No. 148, July 31, 1933; also N. R. A. Release
No. 3114, February 5, 1934. Licensing has been evolving for some time. The
effect on professional enterprise has not been oppressive in general but rather
beneficial.
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the crisis demanded solution. Evasion and vacillation are impotent;
for, "he who fights and runs away, will live to fight another day."
The National Recovery Act and its Codes are advanced indus-
trial legislation and may be viewed as a current on which the Ship
of State rides between the Scylla of imperial industrialism and the
Charybdis of dictatorial communism. 130 There is pressing need to
distinguish the progressive and the radical, the constructive and the
destructive in the gigantic program of economic rehabilitation. The
history of American political and social crises engenders the confi-
dence that necessity will call forth another John Marshall to pilot
the Ship of State into the open sea; there are natural rights of civil
and organic nature, inherent in the American Constitution and our
common law, which transcend and must survive the enactment and
enforcement of social and industrial legislation. It is to this problem
that the judiciary of the nation is addressed; the society and industry
of the future rest in the lap of the lawyers of the United States.
EMIL F. KOCH.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AN INTERPRETATION.-When the
present administration came into power the nation was in the throes
of economic despair. Labor and industry called, from that deep
morass of disorganization and self-destruction, for some hand which
they might grasp, for some guide by which they could lift them-
selves from their desperate plight. The administration answered that
call. It set up a system that would enable business to regulate itself
and by which this ruthless and anti-social industrial warfare'would
cease; and so the N. R. A. was born.'
It was soon evident that this regulatory system was threatened
by the tendency of one group to raise itself out of the mire by sub-
jecting the other to oppression. To remove this threat a clause was
inserted by which these two opposing factions could be placed upon
a more equal footing, and by which it could be made evident that
the aspirations of both were inextricably bound up, and that one
must rise or fall with the other. This idea was embodied in a sec-
tion of the National Industrial Recovery Act, now famous as §7A,
and it is an interpretation of this feature that is here sought to be
made.2
The clause as it was written into the N. R. A. is on its face
unambiguous. It provides simply, that "Every code shall contain
the following conditions:
"LEVINE, RED SMOKE (1932); WELLS, KAPOOT (1933).
'N. Y. Times, March 4, 1934, §IV at 5 :1.
'N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 7, 1934, at 24:1.
